WordPress wp-trackback.php漏洞分析 文/Superhei 2007/1/9 1.Stefan Esser大牛2007/01/05发布的WordPress Trackback Charset Decoding SQL Injection Vulnerability [1]
Code:wp-trackback.php
$tb_url = $_POST['url']; $title = $_POST['title']; $excerpt = $_POST['excerpt']; $blog_name = $_POST['blog_name']; $charset = $_POST['charset']; ....... if ( function_exists('mb_convert_encoding') ) { // For international trackbacks $title = mb_convert_encoding($title, get_settings('blog_charset'), $charset); $excerpt = mb_convert_encoding($excerpt, get_settings('blog_charset'), $charset); $blog_name = mb_convert_encoding($blog_name, get_settings('blog_charset'), $charset); } ....... $dupe = $wpdb->get_results("SELECT * FROM $wpdb->comments WHERE comment_post_ID = '$comment_post_ID' AND comment_author_url = '$comment_author_url'");
变量$charset编码post--->mb_convert_encoding()转换为get_settings('blog_charset') [utf-8]---->select
se大牛的exp[2] 是用的uf7编码:'==>+-ACc- 饶过gpc,然后通过mb_convert_encoding转化为utf-8 '<==+-ACc-
其实这个就是编码引起的2次攻击[3]饶过gpc引起的SqlInj。
官方发布的补丁:2.0.6 wp-trackback.php
// These three are stripslashed here so that they can be properly escaped after mb_convert_encoding() $title = stripslashes($_POST['title']); $excerpt = stripslashes($_POST['excerpt']); $blog_name = stripslashes($_POST['blog_name']); ......... // Now that mb_convert_encoding() has been given a swing, we need to escape these three $title = $wpdb->escape($title); $excerpt = $wpdb->escape($excerpt); $blog_name = $wpdb->escape($blog_name);
变量经过stripslashes()--->mb_convert_encoding()--->escape()--->select
我们看看escape() :wp-includes\wp-db.php
function escape($string) { return addslashes( $string ); // Disable rest for now, causing problems if( !$this->dbh || version_compare( phpversion(), '4.3.0' ) == '-1' ) return mysql_escape_string( $string ); else return mysql_real_escape_string( $string, $this->dbh ); }
mysql_real_escape_string()在一定的条件下是可以绕过的: The addslashes() Versus mysql_real_escape_string() Debate http://shiflett.org/archive/184 村雨牛牛在xcon也说过,但是mysql支持gbk的情况还是比较少的。有兴趣的可以自己测试下 :)
2.rgod于2007/01/08发布的WordPress <= 2.0.6 wp-trackback.php Zend_Hash_Del_Key_Or_Index / sql injection exploit [4]
Code:wp-settings.php
function unregister_GLOBALS() { if ( !ini_get('register_globals') ) return;
if ( isset($_REQUEST['GLOBALS']) ) die('GLOBALS overwrite attempt detected');
// Variables that shouldn't be unset $noUnset = array('GLOBALS', '_GET', '_POST', '_COOKIE', '_REQUEST', '_SERVER', '_ENV', '_FILES', 'table_prefix'); $input = array_merge($_GET, $_POST, $_COOKIE, $_SERVER, $_ENV, $_FILES, isset($_SESSION) && is_array($_SESSION) ? $_SESSION : array()); foreach ( $input as $k => $v ) if ( !in_array($k, $noUnset) && isset($GLOBALS[$k]) ) unset($GLOBALS[$k]); }
unregister_GLOBALS();
这里unset了$_GET, $_POST, $_COOKIE, $_SERVER, $_ENV, $_FILES, $_SESSION 等提交的变量。
Code:wp-trackback.php
if ( !intval( $tb_id ) ) //注意这个 trackback_response(1, 'I really need an ID for this to work.');
.................
if ( !empty($tb_url) && !empty($title) && !empty($tb_url) ) { header('Content-Type: text/xml; charset=' . get_option('blog_charset') );
$pingstatus = $wpdb->get_var("SELECT ping_status FROM $wpdb->posts WHERE ID = $tb_id"); ......
$tb_id没有’ 通过unset后存在end_Hash_Del_Key_Or_Index漏洞,导致注射。在分析时候提交:tb_id='&1740009377=1&496546471=1 返回:I really need an ID for this to work 原来是在 : if ( !intval( $tb_id ) ) //这里拦住了。 trackback_response(1, 'I really need an ID for this to work.'); 提交tb_id=1'&1740009377=1&496546471=1 成功触发,这里引发了一比较有意思的问题 : <? //test.php print intval($_REQUEST["id"]); ?> 提交test.php?id=a1 得到 0,提交test.php?id=12a 得到 12。 可以看出 intval是根据第1个字符来判断的,这样如果是像wp这样的判断:if ( !intval( $_ ) ) 还是有安全隐患的。
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